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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Petitioner-Appellant Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr. ("Pizzuto"), who was sentenced to
death for the 1985 first-degree murders of Berta Herndon and her nephew, Delbert
Herndon, appeals from the district court's Memorandum Opinion and Order denying his
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)
(''Motion") that was filed September 25, 2019, more than 10 years after this Court affirmed
the denial of his fifth petition for post-conviction relief on February 22, 2008.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The facts leading to Pizzuto' s convictions and death sentences are summarized in
State v. Pizzuto (Pizzuto I), 119 Idaho 742, 748-49 (1991). Prior to trial, Pizzuto was
examined on December 12, 1985 by Dr. Michael P. Emery. (R., pp.801-02.) During the
examination, Dr. Emery gave Pizzuto several psychological tests, including the verbal
portion of the WAIS-R Verbal Scale IQ test. (Id., p.801.) Pizzuto scored 72, which Dr.
Emery opined "falls in the borderline range of intellectual deficiency." (Id.) However,
according to Dr. Emery "[b]oth [Pizzuto's] Rorschach and Bender-Gestalt suggested
somewhat higher intellectual potential." (Id.) At Pizzuto's sentencing hearing, Dr. Emery
discussed his diagnosis of borderline intellectual deficiency, explaining it was "because
[Pizzuto] did score in the seventies in the Wexler Verbal." (#16489, Sent. Tr., p.148.)1
However, Dr. Emery qualified his diagnosis, explaining that Pizzuto "showed more

The district court took judicial notice of the Clerk's Records and Reporter's Transcripts
from Pizzuto's trial, sentencing, and his prior post-conviction cases. (Tr., p.7.) Therefore,
when referring to the Clerk's Records or Reporter's Transcripts from Pizzuto's prior cases,
the state will refer to them first by case number. For the Clerk's Record and Reporter's
Transcripts in this appeal, the state will merely refer to them as "R" and "Tr."
1

1

intelligence in his conversations, his choice of words, and very frequently individuals who
come out of a background similar to that of Mr. Pizzuto' s, with the intellectual interchange,
the testing would be spuriously low especially on the verbal scale." (Id., p.180.) Pizzuto
was sentenced to death for Berta and Delbert's murders. (#16489, R., pp.1322-24.)
As required by I.C. § 19-2719, Pizzuto filed his first post-conviction petition, which
the district court denied. See Pizzuto v. State (Pizzuto III), 134 Idaho 793, 794-95 (2000).
In a consolidated appeal, this Court affirmed Pizzuto' s first-degree murder convictions, the
death sentences, and the denial of post-conviction relief. See generally Pizzuto I.
In 1992, Pizzuto filed his first federal habeas petition. Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F .3d
th
949, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), dissent amended and superseded in part by, 385 F.3d 1247 (9

Cir. 2004). While that petition was pending, Pizzuto filed his second post-conviction
petition, which the district court dismissed pursuant to LC. § 19-2719 because the claims
were known or reasonably could have been known when he filed his first post-conviction
petition. Pizzuto v. State (Pizzuto II), 127 Idaho 469,470 (1995). The state filed a motion
to dismiss Pizzuto' s appeal, which this Court granted. See generally Pizzuto II. In 1997,
the federal district court denied Pizzuto's habeas claims. Pizzuto, 280 F.3d at 954. While
his habeas appeal was pending, Pizzuto filed his third post-conviction petition, which the
district court dismissed because the claims were known or reasonably could have been
known when the earlier post-conviction petitions were filed. Pizzuto III, 134 Idaho at 795.
Based upon I.C. §19-2719, this Court affirmed. See generally Pizzuto III. As a result of
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Pizzuto filed a fourth post-conviction petition, which
was dismissed by the district court. Pizzuto v. State (Pizzuto V), 146 Idaho 720, 723

2

2
(2008). This Court dismissed Pizzuto' s appeal. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial

of federal habeas relief. See generally Pizzuto, 280 F.3d 949.
While Pizzuto' s Ninth Circuit appeal was still pending, the Supreme Court decided
At~ins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), concluding the execution of intellectually disabled
3
("ID") murderers violates the Eighth Amendment. While concluding there was a "national

consensus" that had developed against executing ID murderers, id. at 316, the Court
recognized that any "serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded
offenders" stems from "which offenders are in fact retarded," and "[n]ot all people who
claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally
retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus," id. at 317. Although the
Court referenced two clinical definitions for ID and noted that, while statutory definitions
are not identical, they "generally conform to the clinical definitions," id. at 317 n.22, the
Court declined to adopt a rigid test defining the parameters of ID, reasoning, "'we leave to
the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction
upon [their] execution of sentences,"' id. at 317 (brackets in original) (quoting Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
Responding to Atkins, the Legislature enacted I.C. § 19-251 SA, prohibiting the
execution of ID murderers and establishing requirements that must be met to prove an ID

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the dismissal of Pizzuto' s Ring appeal.
Pizzuto v. Idaho, 552 U.S. 1227 (2008). Upon remand, Pizzuto's appeal was consolidated
with several others, and this Court affirmed the district court, concluding that Ring is not
retroactive under Idaho law. Rhoades et al. v. State (Pizzuto IV), 149 Idaho 130 (2010).

2

At that time, "intellectual disability" was known as "mental retardation." Because the
courts and authorities now use the term "intellectual disability," Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S.
701, 704 (2014), that is the phrase the state will use except when quoting material that
expressly uses the phrase, "mental retardation."

3

3

claim in Idaho. 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 136 §§ 4 & 6, p.398. In concert with the
clinical definitions from Atkins, the Legislature defined ID as requiring three elements: (1)
"significantly subaverage general intelligence functioning" defined as "an intelligent
quotient score of seventy (70) or below"; (2) "accompanied by significant limitation in
adaptive functioning in at least two (2) of the following skill areas: communication, selfcare, home living, social or interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health and safety"; and (3) "onset of significant
subaverage general intelligence functioning and significant limitations in adaptive
functioning must occur before age eighteen (18) years." J.C. § 19-2515A(l)(a).
Contending he is ID, Pizzuto filed a fifth post-conviction petition on June 19, 2003
(#32679, R., pp.1-10), with a number of attachments that included, among others: (1) a
June 18, 2003 affidavit of Dr. Craig W. Beaver who explained that in 1996 he "conducted
a comprehensive neuropsychological examination" of Pizzuto that "demonstrated limited
intellectual skills indicative of possible of [sic] mild mental retardation" and that Pizzuto
"likely meets the standard recently enacted in Idaho Code Section 19-251 SA regarding
defendants who are mentally retarded" (id., p.59); (2) the January 23, 1986 letter from Dr.
Emery discussing his December 12, 1985 examination of Pizzuto (id., pp.161-62); (3) an
April 1, 1988 letter from Dr. James R. Merikangas who "suggested" that Pizzuto was "brain
damaged" "as a result of a traumatic brain injury," and that his "long history of polydrug
abuse [ ] caused him further neurological dysfunction and [ ] caused him to have substantial
defects of mind and reason" (id., pp.94-98); and (4) an undated affidavit from Dr. Beaver
referencing the 1996 neuropsychometric examination, and opining, "[t]he combination of
[ ] Pizzuto having a seizure disorder, neurocognitive limitations that affect his impulse

4

control and decision making, combined with the neurotoxic affects [sic] of polysubstance
abuse would have significantly impacted his abilities to make appropriate decisions and to
control his behavior in an appropriate and community acceptable manner" (id., pp.100-07).
The state filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal, asserting the petition was not
timely, and that the petition sought retroactive application of Atkins, in violation of LC. §
19-2719. (Id., pp.114-15.) Pizzuto filed a motion for more testing, including another
neuropsychiatric evaluation with a supporting affidavit (id., pp.131-40), an additional letter
from Dr. Merikangas suggesting brain imaging (id., p.142), and a September 15, 2004
affidavit from Dr. Beaver referencing his 1996 examination of Pizzuto and, because it had
been "over eight years since his last comprehensive neuropsychological examination,"
"strongly recommend[ing] that he undergo repeat neuropsychometric studies" "to better
determine [Pizzuto' s] cognitive abilities" because ''persistent seizure disorders, for
example, will decline over time in their overall mental abilities" (id., pp.173-76).
Pizzuto also filed a motion to disqualify the district judge (id., pp.122-24), which
was denied (id., pp.193-94). Both the district court and this Court denied Pizzuto' s requests
for an interlocutory appeal. (Id., pp.232-23; R., pp.37-45.) Without noticing his motion
for additional testing for a hearing, Pizzuto filed a number of additional affidavits (#32679,
R., pp.248-76) and a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that, because of the evidence
he had submitted, "there are no genuine issues of material fact" and he "is entitled to the
requested judgment as a matter oflaw" (id., pp.280-81). After oral argument (#32679, Tr.,
pp.71-106), the district court denied Pizzuto's Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding
his fifth post-conviction petition was untimely and, alternatively, "failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact supporting his claim of mental retardation" (#32679, R., pp.309-10).

5

Addressing the merits of Pizzuto' s ID claim, this Court concluded he failed to
present sufficient evidence establishing two elements under LC. § 19-251 SA(l ): an IQ of
70 or below and onset before age 18; the court did not address whether Pizzuto established
the second prong of LC. § 19-2515A(l) - significant limitations in adaptive functioning.
Pizzuto V, 146 Idaho at 728-3 3.
While his Atkins post-conviction was pending, Pizzuto received permission from
the Ninth Circuit to file a successive habeas petition based upon the contention that he was
ID; that petition was filed December 19, 2005. 4 Pizzuto v. Blades, 2012 WL 73236, *3
(D. Idaho 2012); (R., pp.811-40). Additional psychological testing was completed by Dr.
Ricardo Weinstein in January 2009, including the WAIS-IV IQ test where Pizzuto scored
61 on verbal comprehension, 67 on perceptual reasoning, 80 on working memory, 56 on
full processing speed, and a full-scale score of 60. (R., p.58.) Pizzuto also provided reports
from Dr. James R. Patton (R., pp.71-84) and Dr. Merikangas (R., pp.86-89).
In preparation for an evidentiary hearing, the state obtained Dr. Beaver's records
from the 1996 neuropsychological examination he completed with Pizzuto that included
IQ testing establishing that Pizzuto had a verbal IQ score of 91, a performance IQ score of
94, and a full scale IQ score of 92. (R., p.804.) The state also proffered a report and two
addendums from Dr. Roger Moore explaining Pizzuto is not ID. (R., pp.842-55, 940, 942.)
After the evidentiary hearing (R., pp.944-1368), the district court denied habeas
relief under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), concluding

Pizzuto also filed other requests with the Ninth Circuit to file successive habeas petitions
th
and other collateral challenges. See Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 1171 (9 Cir. 2015);
th
Pizzuto v. Blades, 673 F.3d 1003 (9 Cir. 2012). He also filed a sixth post-conviction
petition in 2005, which was summarily dismissed pursuant to LC.§ 19-2719, and this Court
affirmed. Pizzuto v. State (Pizzuto VI), 149 Idaho 155 (2010).

4
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this Court's decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Atkins, or based
upon an unreasonable determination of facts from the evidence presented to the state
courts. Pizzuto, 2012 WL 73236 at *4-13. The court also denied habeas relief under de

novo review, concluding Pizzuto failed to establish his IQ was significantly subaverage
(meaning an IQ of 70 or below) prior to age 18, id. at *13-16; the court concluded Pizzuto
met his burden of establishing significant limitations in adaptive functioning, id. at *16-21.
Explaining its rationale regarding Pizzuto's IQ score, the court addressed each of
the three IQ scores presented during the hearing: (1) the 1985 verbal score of 72 on the
WAIS-R given by Dr. Emery; (2) the 1996 full scale IQ score of92 on the WAIS-Rfrom
Dr. Beaver; and (3) the 2009 full scale IQ score of 60 on the WAIS-IV given by Dr.
Weinstein. Id. at *13-16. Of the three scores, the court gave Dr. Weinstein's 2009 testing
"the least weight" because it was given 35 years after Pizzuto' s eighteenth birthday and
"Pizzuto' s advanced cardiovascular disease could have contributed to an overall decline in
his mental ability." Id. at *14. While not entirely discounting the 1985 score, the court
found "the score to be a low estimation of Pizzuto' s full intellectual functioning before he
turned 18" since "Dr. Emery did not record a full scale score and has since disposed of his
raw data," and "Pizzuto's drug use and other neurological problems may have affected his
cognitive functioning at the time." Id. at *14-15. Addressing the 1996 Beaver scores, the
court gave Pizzuto the benefit of the doubt by granting him an "adjustment" based upon
the "Flynn Effect," which would have dropped the numerical range between 82 and 92. Id.
at * 15. However, the court recognized that "still [did] not get him close to the threshold
for significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning." Id. The court ultimately
concluded, "Pizzuto's intellectual functioning was likely higher than the Emery verbal
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score of 72 indicates but lower than the Beaver full scale score of 92." Id. at* 16. While
recognizing this placed the score "most likely somewhere in the 80s," the court declined to
"determine a precise numerical score," concluding, Pizzuto had not proven "that his
general intellectual functioning at the relevant time was significantly subaverage; that is,
that he had an IQ of 70 or below." Id. The court also denied Pizzuto's Motion to Alter or
Amend under Rule 59(e). Pizzuto v. Blades, 2012 WL 1189908 (D. Idaho 2012).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed based upon AEDPA deference. Pizzuto v. Blades, 729
F.3d 1211 (9 th Cir. 2013). However, because Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014) was
issued after the Ninth Circuit's decision was filed, the Circuit withdrew its opinion, vacated
the district court's order, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Hall.
Pizzuto v. Blades, 758 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2014).
On remand, the district court gleaned three main points from Hall: (1) ''subaverage
intellectual functioning-the first prong of the intellectual disability analysis-can be
established by evidence of an IQ score, and an IQ score of 70 or below will satisfy that
prong"; (2) "an IQ score of 76 or higher means that the individual does not suffer from
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and, therefore, is not entitled to relief
under Atkins"; and (3) "petitioners with IQ scores of 71 to 75 must be allowed to present
additional evidence of intellectual disability, including additional evidence of subaverage
intellectual functioning and evidence of the second and third prongs of the analysis-deficits
in adaptive functioning and onset before the age of eighteen." Pizzuto v. Blades, 2016 WL
6963030, *5 (D. Idaho 2016). However, recognizing the limitations of AEDPA, the court
explained that, because the holding from Hall was not clearly established at the time of the
this Court's decision in 2008, this Court was only bound by the holding from Atkins, and

8

this Court's decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Atkins.
Id. at *8-9. Alternatively, the district court assumed that, even if Atkins barred using a
hard IQ score of 70 or below, this Court's decision - that Pizzuto failed to establish "any
subaverage intellectual functioning developed before he turned eighteen-the third prong of
the intellectual disability analysis" - "was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent." Id. at *9 (emphasis in original).
Finally, the district court reexamined Pizzuto's ID claim under de novo review, and
initially concluded that his request to reopen the evidentiary hearing was unwarranted
because he "had an adequate opportunity and a strong incentive to bring forward all his
evidence at the evidentiary hearing." Id. at * 11. The court then explained that "nothing in

Hall renders suspect any of the Court's previous findings and conclusions on de novo
review" and, declining to "re-invent the wheel," adopted its previous de novo analysis from
the first decision and the denial of Pizzuto's Rule 59(e) motion. Id.
Applying the deferential review of AEDPA to this Court's decision, on August 14,
2019, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding this Court's decision was neither contrary to,
nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Comt precedent because the only precedent
available to this Court at the time of its decision was Atkins; Hall and its progeny were
decided after this Court filed its decision and the new requirements from Hall - that the
legal determination of intellectual disability be informed by the medical community's
diagnostic framework - was not mandated by Atkins. Pizzuto v. Blades, 933 F.3d 1166,
1179-85 (9th Cir. 2019). The court also addressed each of Pizzuto's arguments under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), and concluded that Pizzuto failed to establish this Court's decision
was based upon an unreasonable determination of facts. Id. at 1185-90. Based upon

9

Pizzuto's failure to overcome the limitations associated with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the court
declined to address the district court's de novo review of Pizzuto' s ID claim based on the
evidentiary hearing evidence or "address whether [he] is intellectually disabled or whether
his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment." Id. However, in dicta, the court
stated its decision "does not preclude the Idaho courts from reconsidering those questions
in light of intervening events," particularly subsequent Supreme Court precedent. Id. On
December 31, 2019, the Ninth Circuit denied Pizzuto' s Petition for Rehearing En Banc,
but issued an amended opinion that made no substantive changes from its August 2019
5
th
opinion. See Pizzuto v. Yordy~ 947 F.3d 510 (9 Cir. 2019).

While his Petition for Rehearing En Banc was pending before the Ninth Circuit,
based upon the Circuit's August 14, 2019 decision, coupled with prior counsel's alleged
deficiencies when she filed the Atkins post-conviction petition, Pizzuto filed his Rule
60(b)(6) Motion, supporting brief (R., pp.13-25), and several documents from the previous
litigation ofhis Atkins claim (R., pp.36-117). The state responded, asserting that Pizzuto's
Motion was untimely, he failed to establish unique and compelling circumstances as
required under Rule 60(b)(6), and that his request for an evidentiary hearing was barred by
the doctrine of resjudicata. (R., pp.728-61.) On January 6, 2020, the district court denied
Pizzuto's Motion, agreeing it was untimely and that he failed to meet the requirements of
Rule 60(b)(6) by showing unique and compelling circumstances.

(R., pp.1376-83.)

Pizzuto's timely Notice of Appeal was filed January 10, 2020. (R., pp.1385-96.)

For that reason, the state will refer to the Ninth Circuit's August 14, 2019 opinion, since
that's the opinion upon which Pizzuto relies as the operative basis for his Motion.
5
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ISSUES

Pizzuto has phrased the issues on appeal as follows:
A.

Whether Mr. Pizzuto's I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion was timely.

B.

Whether Mr. Pizzuto's I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion was meritorious.

(Brief, p.4.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows:
Because Pizzuto has failed to articulate how the district court abused its discretion,
should the lower court's decision be affirmed?
Alternatively,
Because Pizzuto filed his 60(b)(6) Motion years after the Supreme Court's decision
in Hall v. Florida, has he failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by
concluding his Motion was untimely?
Alternatively,
Because Pizzuto has failed to establish "unique and compelling circumstances," has
he failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 60(b)(6)
Motion?

ARGUMENT

I.
Pizzuto Has Failed To Establ~sh The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Finding His
Rule 60{b)(6) Motion Was Untimely And That He Failed To Demonstrate Unique And
Compelling Circumstances
A.

Introduction
Initially, the district court should be affirmed because Pizzuto has failed to even

cite the four-part standard for abuse of discretion, which is the standard of review that
governs his appeal. Even if he had cited the standard, because he has failed to explain
which part of the standard the district court did not follow or exactly how the district court
abused its discretion, the district court must be affirmed.
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Assuming he passes this procedural requirement, Pizzuto contends his Motion was
timely because the underlying predicate for filing his Motion was the Ninth Circuit's
August 14, 2019 decision. (Brief, pp.5-8.) However, because the underlying predicate for
Pizzuto's Motion was no later than the Supreme Court's decision in Hall v. Florida, the
time for calculating the timeliness of his Motion is May 27, 2014, when Hall was decided.
Without discussing the parameters of I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) and merely contending the
district court applied "a hyper-technical framework based on pleading rules that do not
even apply to Rule 60(b) motions" (Brief, p.15), Pizzuto contends the district court erred
for two reasons both stemming from the Ninth Circuit's opinion: (1) this Court's opinion
did not comply with "the latest scientific and legal standards"; and (2) post-conviction
counsel's negligence during litigation of Pizzuto's Atkins' claim constitutes unique and
compelling circumstances under Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731 (2010). (Brief, pp.9-21.)
Pizzuto' s arguments fail because no Idaho court has held that a decision from the Ninth
Circuit warrants reopening a case under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) when this Court complied with
the legal standards that existed at that time, and that compliance was recognized by the
Supreme Court. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's decision and dicta failed to recognize that
this Court's decision was also based upon Pizzuto's failure to establish prong three of LC.
§ 19-2515A(l)- that the "onset of significant subaverage general intelligence functioning

and significant limitations in adaptive functioning must occur before age eighteen (18)
years." Finally, Pizzuto has not come close to establishing a "complete absence of
meaningful representation" of post-conviction counsel as required under Eby.
Finally, based upon reports of Drs. Weinstein, Patton, and Merikangas, Pizzuto
contends he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because there is a genuine issue of material
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fact and a hearing is mandated by the Constitution. (Brief, p.29.) Because Pizzuto's
Motion fails on the merits, his arguments for an evidentiary hearing fail.

Irrespective,

because of the federal evidentiary hearing, a state hearing is barred under the doctrine of
res judicata, particularly since the federal court credited Dr. Beaver's testing establishing
Pizzuto's full-scale IQ score in 1996 was 92, well above the 70 score threshold for ID.
B.

Standard Of Review
Review of a decision under LR. C.P. 60(b)(6) "presents a discretionary decision for

the trial court." In Re SRBA Case No. 39576 Subase No. 37-00864, 164 Idaho 241, 248
(2018). As recently clarified by this Court:
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration offour essentials. Whether the
trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4)
reached its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original); see also
State v. Glodowski, --- Idaho ---, 463 P .3d 405, 408 (2020).
Relying upon Eby, 148 Idaho at 734, Pizzuto contends that, because "these are
essentially legal conclusions and do not depend on any factual :findings deserving of
appellate deference" and "the district judge who denied the motion was not the one who
observed prior counsel's conduct when she made the mistakes at issue here," "de nova
review is appropriate." (Brief, p.4.) However, the portion of Eby upon which Pizzuto
relies involves the interpretation of Idaho's Rules of Civil Procedure, not the decision
whether to grant or deny a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See Eby. 149 Idaho at 734 ("The
interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is a matter oflaw over which this Court
has free review."). Pizzuto has failed to cite any decision where this Court reviewed a
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district court's decision regarding a Rule 60(b)(6) motion de nova. Pizzuto has also failed
to cite any authority for the broad proposition that, merely because the judge did not
observe prior counsel's conduct, the denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is reviewed de novo.
Pizzuto obviously contends the district court's decision should be reviewed de novo
because the abuse of discretion standard is much more difficult to overcome. As explained
in State v. Nava, --- Idaho ---, 2020 WL 3263923, *2 (2020), "The standard of review for
an abuse of discretion results in this Court giving deference to the trial court. A de novo
standard does not afford the trial court any deference." See also Brauner v. AHC ofBoise,
LLC, --- Idaho---, 459 P.3d 1246, 1263-64 (2020) (Bevan, J., concurring) (explaining the
"high bar" that must be overcome under an abuse of discretion standard). However,
irrespective of the standard applied, Pizzuto has failed to establish the district court erred.
C.

Pizzuto Has Failed To Explain How The District Court Abused Its Discretion
Presumably, Pizzuto relies upon the lower standard because he has failed to explain

which part of the abuse of discretion standard the district court violated. As stated in Matter
of Doe I, 165 Idaho 33, 44 (2019) (quotes and citation omitted), "The party asserting the
abuse of discretion carries the burden of demonstrating that an abuse of discretion occurred,
and a failure to do so is fatal to its argument." "Failing to demonstrate that an abuse of
discretion occurred under any part of the test applied by this Court is fatal to an argument
that the court abused its discretion." Id. (quotes, citations, ellipsis, and brackets omitted).
This requires more than citation to the legal standard, but requires "argument on how the
[district] court abused its discretion." Kelly v. Kelly. 165 Idaho 716, 731 (2019).
In State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 575 n.2 (2017), this Court noted its concern
with the "increasing number of cases where a party completely fails to address the factors
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we consider when evaluating a claimed abuse of discretion." The Court emphasized,
"when a party does not contend that the district court failed to perceive the issue as one of
discretion, that the district court failed to act within the boundaries of this discretion and
consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it or that
the district court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason, such a conclusory
argument is fatally deficient to the party's case." Id. (quotes and citation omitted). While
the Court does not "require a formalistic recitation of the abuse of discretion standard to
review a claim of abuse of discretion," more is required than "the use of conclusory
arguments, lack of authority to support those arguments, or failure to make any attempt to
address the factors this Court considers." State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 870 (2019).
Not only has Pizzuto failed to explain which part of the four-part standard the
district court abused, he has failed to address any of the factors. Pizzuto fails to even
articulate the standards under LR. C.P. 60(b)(6), but merely contends his Motion was
timely, and that "there are two bases for retracting the previously entered judgment in light
of the Ninth Circuit opinion: (1) the opinion erodes the legal and scientific bases for this
Court's 2008 decision ... ; and (2) the opinion exposes prior counsel's negligence and its
consequences." (Brief, p.9.) Such an argument does not meet this Court's directive to
address the four-part abuse of discretion standard or otherwise explain how the district
court abused its discretion. On this basis alone, Pizzuto' s arguments fail and the district
court's decision should be affirmed.
D.

General Legal Standards Under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)
"Petitions for post-conviction relief are civil proceedings governed by the Idaho

Rules of Civil Procedure." Pizzuto V, 146 Idaho at 724 (quotes, citation, and brackets
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omitted). Under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), the court may "relieve a pmiy or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" for "any other reason that justifies relief."
"Although the court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny
a Rule 60(b) motion, its discretion is limited and may be granted only on a showing of
unique and compelling circumstances justifying relief." In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 164
Idaho at 252 (quotes, citation, and brackets omitted); see also Eby. 148 Idaho at 736 (same).
Idaho's appellate courts have not defined what constitutes "unique and compelling
circumstances justifying relief." However, Idaho's appellate courts have "infrequently
granted relief under Rule 60(b )(6)." Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571, 578 (2009); see also
Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 450 (2012) (citing
cases) ("We have generally, but sparingly, applied [the unique and compelling
circumstances standard] in cases where a party seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(6).").
Nevertheless, ''relief under Rule 60(b)(6) may be appropriate where the district court
granted relief that is inconsistent with the pleadings and evidence in the case or is beyond
what was sought in the complaint." Profits Plus Capital Management, LLC v. Podesta, 156
Idaho 873, 886 (2014) (citing Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 380-81
(2010)). Additionally, ''the complete absence of meaningful representation in a postconviction proceeding may be 'unique and compelling circumstances' warranting relief
under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)," id. (citing Eby, 148 Idaho at 737), or "where a person lacking the
capacity to sue or be sued is represented in an action, whether by a natural guardian,
guardian ad litem, or next friend, and the representative completely fails to prosecute a
meritorious claim that results in the claim being dismissed with prejudice," Berg. 147 Idaho
at 579. Relief has also been affirmed "where defense counsel's representation to an
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unrepresented plaintiff constituted overreaching." Profits Plus Capital Management, LLC,
156 Idaho at 886 (citing Hopkins v. Troutner, 134 Idaho 445, 447-48 (2000)).
Even if ''unique and compelling circumstances" are demonstrated, "[a] motion
under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1 ), (2), and (3)
no more than 6 months after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the
proceeding." I.R.C.P. 60(c)(l). "What constitutes a reasonable time depends upon the
facts in each individual case." Viafax Com. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 70 (Ct. App.
2000). However, "[t]he six-month period specified in Rule 60(b) is the outermost limit,
and a motion may be rejected as untimely if not made within a 'reasonable time' even
though the six-month period has not elapsed." Id. at 71. For example, in Viafax, the Idaho
Court of Appeals concluded that a "delay of nearly five months in seeking Rule 60(b)
relief' was not a reasonable time. Id. Ultimately, "[t]he question of reasonableness is
ordinarily a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact." Davis v. Parrish, 131 Idaho
595, 597 (1998) (quotes and citation omitted).
In the context of deciding the timeliness of successive post-conviction claims, a
"reasonable time" is measured from the date the petitioner discovered the factual basis of
the claim being asserted. See Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905 (2007). And in the
context of successive capital post-conviction cases, the reasonable time period "is fortytwo days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the claim, unless
the petitioner shows that there were extraordinary circumstances that prevented him or her
from filing the claim within that period. In that event, it still must be filed within a
reasonable time after the claim was known or knowable." Pizzuto V, 146 Idaho at 727.
"The reasonable time at issue is the time necessary to develop sufficient facts to file the
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post-conviction proceeding, not the time necessary to develop all facts that will be offered
in an attempt to prove the claim." Id.
E.

Pizzuto Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Concluding His Motion Is Untimely
Pizzuto contends the district court erred because "the predicate for [his] motion was

the new Ninth Circuit opinion, which was originally handed down on August 14, 2019,"
and not May 27, 2014, when the Supreme Court issued Hall v. Florida. (Brief, p.5.)
Pizzuto' s argument is contrary to the standards under Rule 60(b)( 6).
As repeatedly discussed by Pizzuto, and recognized by the district court (R., pp.89), the underlying legal and factual basis for Pizzuto's Motion is this Court's alleged failure
to comply with the latest scientific and legal standards as articulated in Hall, 572 U.S. at
710, which instructed that, "[i]n determining who qualifies as intellectually disabled, it is
proper to consult the medical community's opinions." Hall was issued May 27, 2014, but
Pizzuto did not file his Motion until September 25, 2019, more than five years later.
Obviously, Pizzuto was aware of Hall, because on July 15, 2014, the Ninth Circuit
withdrew its prior opinion, vacated the federal district court's first decision, and remanded
"for further proceedings consistent with Hall." Pizzuto, 758 F.3d at 1179. Rather than file
a motion in state court, Pizzuto elected to throw all of his eggs into the federal habeas
basket and have the federal courts decide the constitutionality of his death sentence under
Hall, without any input from Idaho's courts. Simply stated, all of the legal and factual
bases for Pizzuto's Motion were known on May 27, 2014, when Hall was issued. Pizzuto
did not need the Ninth Circuit to tell him this Court's decision allegedly failed to comply
with Hall, and the latest scientific and legal standards articulated therein. He should have
filed any request for relief based upon Hall and its progeny in state court within 42 days of
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Hall being issued. Cf Pizzuto V, 146 Idaho at 727 ("a reasonable time for filing a
successive petition for post-conviction relief is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or
reasonably should have known of the claim").
Even after remand when the federal district court denied relief on November 28,
2016, and concluded that Hall and its progeny did not entitle him to relief under AEDPA
or de nova review, Pizzuto, 2016 WL 6963030, *6-11, Pizzuto filed nothing in state court,

but chose to make all his Hall arguments before the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
noted that both parties not only discussed Atkins and Hall, but also the Supreme Court's
more recent decisions in Brumfield v. Cain, --- U.S. ---, 135 S.Ct. 2269 (2015) and Moore
v. Texas, --- U.S. ---, 137 S.Ct. 1039 (2017). Pizzuto, 933 F.3d at 1179. Obviously,
nothing prevented Pizzuto from filing his Motion years ago; he simply chose to wait for
the Ninth Circuit's decision and then attempted to reopen his current post-conviction case,
thereby further delaying his execution.
Pizzuto all but concedes Hall was the triggering device by stating, "Hall might have
served as a valid triggering point for a different Rule 60(b) motion." (Brief, p.6) (emphasis
in original). However, Pizzuto fails to explain what that "different" motion would have
been, and merely contends that even if Hall was a triggering device, "the Ninth Circuit's
opinion was a valid triggering point for the motion that was actually filed." (Id.) Of course,
Pizzuto has provided no authority for the broad proposition that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is
timely when the underlying basis for filing the motion was known years before it was filed
even if there is a subsequent triggering event that is based upon the same factual and legal
basis, particularly when that triggering event is merely a lower federal court's dicta that is
hardly binding on this or any other Idaho court. Delaying the filing of a Rule 60(b)(6)
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motion to await a new trigging event based upon the same factual and legal basis cannot
be considered filing within a "reasonable time," but indicates deliberate delay.
This Court has explained that decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on
state courts. State v. McNeely. 162 Idaho 413, 415 (2017). And in this case, the Ninth
Circuit's statement - that nothing "precluded the Idaho courts from reconsidering those
questions in light of intervening events" - did not constitute a "decision," see Pizzuto, 94 7
F.3d at 534, but is mere dicta based upon an incomplete analysis of this Court's decision
th
in Pizzuto V. Export Group v. Reef Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1472 (9 Cir. 1995)

(statements not necessary to the decision are dicta and thus are not binding precedent);
Petersen v. State, 87 Idaho 361,365 (1964) (parts of a decision that appear "to have played
no role in the ultimate decision of the court" are dicta). As such, the Ninth Circuit's
decision and dicta hardly constitute a "unique and compelling circumstance" allowing the
clock to restart years after Hall was issued.
Pizzuto next contends, irrespective of the Ninth Circuit's decision and dicta, that
there was "no valid event in the scientific community" or legal developments "that could
have legitimately triggered a Rule 60(b) motion" because the scientific and legal arguments
upon which he relies were present in Atkins. (Brief, pp.6-8.) Pizzuto's argument relies
upon a fundamentally flawed analysis of Atkins and its progeny.
In Atkins, the Court determined a national consensus had developed against
executing ID murderers and, examining "the relative culpability of mentally retarded
offenders, and the relationships between mental retardation and the penological purposes
served by the death penalty," id. at 317, the Court held "that such punishment is excessive
and that the Constitution places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the
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life of a mentally retarded offender," id. at 321 (internal quotes and citation omitted).
Addressing the existence of a "national consensus," the Court explained:
To the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of
mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact
retarded. In this case, for instance, the Commonwealth of Virginia disputes
that Atkins suffers from mental retardation. Not all people who claim to be
mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally
retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. As was our
approach in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d
335 (1986), with regard to insanity, "we leave to the State[s] the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restrictions upon
[their] execution of sentences." Id., at 405, 416-417, 106 S.Ct. 2595.
Id. at 317 (brackets in original) (footnote omitted).
The Court then noted, "The statutory definitions of mental retardation are not
identical, but generally conform to the clinical definitions set forth" by The American
Association on Mental Retardation ("AAMR") and The American Psychiatric
th
Association's Diagnostic ("APA") and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4 ed

2000) ("DSM-IV"). Id. at 317 n.22 (citing footnote 3). The Court recognized, "clinical
definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but
also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and selfdirection that become manifest before age 18." Id. at 318. However, the Court never held
States must adopt a specific ID definition, but only held that "such punishment is excessive
and that the Constitution places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the
life of a mentally retarded offender." Id. at 321 (internal quotes and citation omitted).
Prior to its decision in Hall, the Supreme Court explained the holding in Atkins:
[T]his Court held, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242,
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of mentally retarded
offenders. Our opinion did not provide definitive procedural or
substantive guides for determining when a person who claims mental
retardation "will be so impaired as to fall [within Atkins' compass]." We
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"le[ft] to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction." Id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 831 (2009) (brackets in original) (emphasis added); see also
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) ("we held [in] Atkins that the execution
of . . . mentally retarded persons are punishments violative of the Eighth Amendment
because the offender had a diminished personal responsibility for the crime"); Baze v.
Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 82 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring) (the "holding" from Atkins is that
"death is an excessive sanction for a mentally retarded defendant"); Schriro v. Smith, 546
U.S. 6, 7 (2005) ("Atkins stated in clear terms that 'we leave to the State[s] the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution
of sentences,'" (quoting Ford, 4 77 U.S. 416-17) (brackets in original).
In Hall, the Supreme Court addressed Florida's ID statute and the Florida Supreme
Court's interpretation of that statute, which established that "a person whose test score is
above 70, including a score within the margin for measurement error, does not have an
intellectual disability and is barred from presenting other evidence that would show his
faculties are limited." 572 U.S. at 711-12. Consequently, because Hall scored 71 on his
IQ test, the state court determined he could not meet the first ID prong. Id. at 707. The
Supreme Court recognized that, because of the bright-line rule of 70, Florida courts could
not consider "evidence of intellectual disability as measured and made manifest by the
defendant's failure or inability to adapt to his social and cultural environment." Id. at 712.
Addressing Florida's bright-line cutoff rule, the Supreme Court explained, "The
question this case presents is how intellectual disability must be defined in order to
implement these principles and the holding of Atkins." Id. at 709 (emphasis added). The
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Court discussed the medical community's established practice of applying the standard
error of measurement ("SEM") to IQ scores and the need to consider adaptive functioning
when an IQ score is 75 or below, and explained that a "significant majority of States
implement the protections of Atkins by taking the SEM into account." Id. at 714-18.
Ultimately, the Court "agree[ed] with the medical experts that when a defendant's IQ test
score falls within the test's acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must
be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony
regarding adaptive deficits." Id. at 723. After discussing Florida's law defining ID, the
Court stated, "This rigid rule, the Court now holds, creates an unacceptable risk that
persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is unconstitutional." Id.
(emphasis added).
The state is unaware of any case, and none has been cited by Pizzuto, establishing
the holding in Atkins required states to adopt SEM or any other clinical standards to inform
an Eighth Amendment analysis. Even the Ninth Circuit has concluded, "Atkins did not
define mental retardation as a matter of federal law. With respect to mental retardation ...
the Supreme Court left to the states the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences." Moormann v. Schriro, 672
F.3d 644, 648 (9 th Cir. 2012) (quotes, citations, brackets omitted). This principle has been
applied to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Moore v. Texas, supra, which addressed
the issue of whether Texas' adherence to superseded medical standards comply with the
th
Eighth Amendment. See Cain v. Chappell, 870 F.3d 1003, 1024 n.9 (9 Cir. 2017).

Atkins did not adopt definitions or guides from any organization or otherwise
establish a constitutional floor involving the implementation of Atkins' Eighth Amendment
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prohibition. The only "bright-line" rule that emerged from Atkins is the exclusion of ID
th
murderers from the death penalty. See U.S. v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 644 (4 Cir. 2010)

(noting Atkins created a "bright-line rule barring execution of [the] mentally retarded").
Consequently, far from Pizzuto' s argument, it was Hall, at the latest, that provided the
triggering point for the filing of his Rule 60(b)(6) Motion.
Even if Atkins adopted such "bright-line" rules, including SEM, the Supreme Court
has recognized this Court did not adopt such a rule in Pizzuto V. In Hall, 572 U.S. at 71418, the Court examined which states were taking SEM into account and acknowledging the
inherent error in using a test score without the necessary adjustment. The Court concluded
only three states-Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia-had adopted such a fixed score cutoff.
Id. at 714. The Court recognized that Idaho was one of at least five states to "have passed
legislation allowing a defendant to present additional evidence of intellectual disability
even when an IQ test score is above 70." Id. at 717; see also Moore, 137 S.Ct. at 1049 n.7
(quotes and citation omitted) ("We referred in Hall to Idaho's capital-sentencing scheme,
however, only to note that the State had passed legislation allowing a defendant to present
additional evidence of intellectual disability even when an IQ test score is above 70.").
Finally, Pizzuto complains the district court allegedly believed his Motion was
untimely "because a post-conviction petitioner asserting the same theory would have been
barred by the limitations period." (Brief, p.8.) However, what Pizzuto fails to appreciate
is that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion cannot be used to circumvent the time limitations of other
rules or statutes. For example, in In Re SRBA Case No. 39576, 164 Idaho at 252, this
Court rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to circumvent the time restraints of I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l)
by filing a motion under Rule 60(b)(6). In Hoopes v. Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 1265-66
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(Ct. App. 1990), the Court of Appeals concluded a Rule 60(b)(6) motion cannot be used to
circumvent the fourteen day time constraint for a motion under I.R.C.P. 59(e) or the fortytwo day period to file an appeal under I.A.R. 14. See also State v. Ross, 141 Idaho 670,
672 (Ct. App. 2005) (same).
Similarly, there is no reason to believe Rule 60(b)(6) can be used to circumvent the
parameters and time frames of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act ("UPCP A")
or LC. § 19-2719, particularly when Pizzuto has filed multiple successive post-conviction
petitions. Pizzuto clearly knew any attempt to file another successive petition would have
been doomed, so, in an attempt to circumvent those restrictions, he filed his Motion
contending the Ninth Circuit's decision was the starting date in determining whether his
Motion was filed within a reasonable period of time. Pizzuto should not be permitted to
circumvent the limitations of the UPCPA or LC.§ 19-2719 by making an end-run around
those provisions through a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. 6
As demonstrated by the numerous successive post-conviction petitions detailed
above, which were rejected because the claims were known or reasonably could have been
known when he filed his first post-conviction petition years ago, coupled with his requests
to file successive habeas petitions or other collateral challenges in federal court, Pizzuto
has embarked upon a strategy of delay. His decision to wait until the Ninth Circuit issued
its decision to file his Motion further demonstrates his intent is to delay by filing his Motion
and litigating his Atkins claim via another evidentiary hearing even though he had an

It is because of this principle that the state asserts Pizzuto's Motion had to be filed within
forty-two days of the Supreme Court's issuance of Hall. In other words, Pizzuto should
not be permitted to circumvent the forty-two day time limit for filing a successive postconviction petition in a capital case merely because he raised his claim under Rule 60(b)(6).

6
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evidentiary hearing in federal court that addressed the issues he raises in his Motion. When
all the facts are considered in Pizzuto' s case, particularly his penchant for filing successive
post-conviction petitions and raising claims that should have been addressed when he filed
his first post-conviction petition, waiting for years after Hall was issued is not "reasonable"
under Rule 60(b)(6), the UPCPA, I.C. § 19-2719, or any other statute or rule. Because
Pizzuto has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by concluding his Rule
60(b)(6) Motion was untimely, the district court's decision should be affirmed.

F.

Pizzuto Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Concluding He Failed To Establish Unique And Compelling Circumstances
a.

The Ninth Circuit's Decision Does Not Create Unique And Compelling
Circumstances

Pizzuto contends the Ninth Circuit's decision establishes unique and compelling
circumstances justifying relief. (Brief, pp.9-16.) While Idaho's appellate courts have not
defined exactly what constitutes "unique and compelling circumstances," Pizzuto has
failed to cite any case, from Idaho or any other jurisdiction, that supports his argument.
Rather, as explained in Section D above, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) has been extremely
limited to very unique circumstances. Moreover, Pizzuto's contention that "the correct
standards" should be used to "ensure that an intellectually disabled man is not executed"
(Brief, p.9) is belied by Dr. Beaver's 1996 testing that showed Pizzuto had a full scale IQ
score of92 (R., p.804), and the federal district court's crediting the 1996 score. Pizzuto,
2012 WL 73236 at *15. It is also belied by the fact that in Pizzuto V, this Court not only
found that Pizzuto had failed to establish "an intelligent quotient score of seventy (70) or
below" as required by the first prong of I. C. § 19-2515 A( 1), but he also failed to establish
the second prong of LC. § 19-2515A(l) - "onset of significant subaverage general
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intelligence functioning ... before age eighteen (18) years." 720 Idaho at 729-33. Indeed,
the vast majority of this Court's decision focused upon the age of onset. Id.
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit's decision focused on the first prong under LC.§ 192515A(l) - "an intelligent quotient score of seventy (70) or below" - and whether this
Court's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Atkins. Pizzuto, 947
F .3d at 523-29. While the court mentioned the third prong - age of onset- it was in cursory
fashion, id. at 529, and in connection with the question of whether this Court's factual
determinations were objectively unreasonable, id. at 530, 531-34. More importantly,
Pizzuto's argument is premised upon the first prong ofl.C. § 19-2515A(l), and ignores the
third prong. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's decision is of no consequence. Indeed, Pizzuto
fails to cite any portion of the Circuit's decision regarding this Court's factual
determination and the third prong ofl.C. § 19-2515A(l).
The state recognizes the Ninth Circuit concluded this Court's decision "was
inconsistent with the clinical definitions in place at the time of [its] decision" because this
Court allegedly applied a "hard IQ-70 cutoff." Pizzuto, 933 F.3d at 1181. However, as
also recognized by the Ninth Circuit, "At the time of [this Court's] decision in 2008, it was
not yet apparent that states were required to define ID in accordance with these prevailing
clinical definitions." Id. at 1182. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, "This is not
a case in which the state court utterly disregarded the clinical definitions" because I. C. §
19-2515A(l) "tracks the clinical definitions cited by Atkins" and this Court "recognized
the existence of a standard error of measurement of plus or minus five points and afforded
Pizzuto an opportunity to 'present additional evidence of intellectual disability even when
an IQ test score is above 70."' Id. at 1183 (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 717). Therefore, at
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the time of this Court's decision, there was no constitutional violation based upon Atkins,
and neither Hall nor the Ninth Circuit's decision mandate the issue be revisited.
In short, Pizzuto is demanding another bite at the apple based upon law that did not
exist at the time of this Court's decision. This does not constitute "unique and compelling
circumstances." It is not uncommon for the law to change. Even in death penalty cases,
the courts are not required to apply new law to cases where the courts appropriately relied
upon the former law. For example, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ring, 536
U.S. 584, LC. § 19-2515 required the district court to determine the existence of any
statutory aggravating factors that made a murderer eligible for the death penalty, and then
determine whether the mitigating circumstances are sufficiently compelling to make
imposition of the death penalty unjust. 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 287, § 1 (codified at
LC. § 19-2515(±) (2000)). However, the Supreme Court issued Ring, 36 U.S. at 609
(quotes and citation omitted), concluding the Sixth Amendment requires juries to find
statutory aggravating factors because they "operate as the functional equivalent of an
element of a greater offense." In Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004), the
Supreme Court reasoned that Ring does not apply retroactively to cases already final on
direct review.

This Court also concluded, under state law, that Ring did not apply

retroactively to five death-sentenced murderers, including Paul Rhoades and Richard
Leavitt. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 133. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Rhoades and
Leavitt' s death sentences were unconstitutional as a result of Ring, they were executed
after Ring was decided even though the statutory aggravating factors were found by a
judge. See Creech v. Reinke, 2012 WL 1995085, *2 (D. Idaho 2012) (noting that "Leavitt's
scheduled execution would be the second to occur in Idaho within a year").
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In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009), the Supreme Court adopted a new
rule involving automobile searches, overruling New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Nevertheless, in Davis v. U.S., 564 U.S. 229, 239 (2011), the Supreme Court concluded
that if a police officer was in compliance with binding precedent at the time, i.e., Belton,
the exclusionary rule would not be applied even though the evidence was obtained illegally
under Gant. In Whorton v. Bockting~ 549 U.S. 406, 416-21 (2007), the Supreme Court
concluded that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which announced a new
Confrontation Clause rule, would not be applied retroactively.
Even in the context of an Atkins claim, the Supreme Court does not appear to be
concerned that a murderer's death sentence will be carried out even though the state court
relied only upon Atkins because Hall and its progeny had not been issued at the time of the
state court's decision. In Shoop v. Hill, --- U.S.---, 139 S.Ct. 504,505 (2019) (per curium),
the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the Ohio courts' decision
was contrary to Atkins. The Supreme Court noted that the Ohio Supreme Court denied
review in 2009, but the Sixth Circuit relied upon Moore, 137 S.Ct. 1039, which was not
issued until 2017, to grant relief under Atkins. Shoop, 139 S.Ct. at 506. Consequently, the
Supreme Court reversed, and ordered the Sixth Circuit to determine whether its conclusions
could be "sustained based strictly on legal rules that were clearly established in the
decisions of this Court at the relevant time," which would be at the time of the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision in 2009. Id. at 509.
Finally, Pizzuto spills considerable ink contending that under the law as it currently
stands, it would be "constitutionally problematic ... for this Court to deny relief." (Brief,
p.12.) Pizzuto is wrong. As explained above, irrespective of SEM, the "Flynn Effect, "or
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any other clinical standards that may have evolved, there was nothing in the Ninth Circuit's
decision, or the changes in Hall and its progeny that would change this Court's conclusion
that Pizzuto failed to establish "onset before age eighteen" - the third prong under LC. §
19-2515A(l). Moreover, as explained above, even under the first prong and de novo
review, the federal district court has credited the IQ score from Dr. Beaver's 1996 testing
and considered SEM and the '"Flynn Effect." There is nothing in the Circuit's decision which didn't address that decision - or Hall and its progeny that undermines that decision.
Although Rule 60(b)(6) is a "catch-all" exception, it is not a reservoir for "the demands of
justice" as alleged by Pizzuto (Brief, p.15), but is very limited to "unique and compelling
circumstances." The court did not "apply a hyper-technical framework based on pleading
rules that do not even apply to Rule 60(b) motions" (id.), but correctly perceived the issue
as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion, acted consistently
with the applicable legal standards, and reached its decision by an exercise of discretion.
Consequently, Pizzuto' s arguments fail.
b.

Representation By Pizzuto's Former Attorney Did Not Involve A Complete
Absence Of Meaningful Representation

Pizzuto next contends that "serious missteps made by his prior attorney in the initial

Atkins post-conviction proceedings" provide unique and compelling circumstances
warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). (Brief, p.16.) Pizzuto's argument is based upon
Eby. 148 Idaho at 734-38. However, the facts in Eby- which Pizzuto ignores - and the
law established therein, run far afield from Pizzuto' s case.
After his convictions were affirmed on appeal, Eby filed a pro se post-conviction
petition on January 24, 2002. Id. at 732-33. The district court appointed the public
defender to represent Eby, who withdrew but designated a conflict attorney to represent
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Eby. Id. at 733. No action was taken by the new attorney, and on August 12, 2002, the
district court issued a proposed dismissal for inactivity under I.R.C.P. 40(c), but withdrew
the notice based upon representations by the public defender regarding the appointment of
another attorney. Id. On October 8, 2002, the prosecutor filed a motion for summary
dismissal. Id. A second conflict attorney, Rolf Kehne, filed a notice of appearance on
October 25, 2002. Id. Between that date and June 14, 2005, the district court issued five
notices of intent to dismiss for inactivity, but Kehne filed no amendments to the petition or
responses to the state's motion, even though he stated on February 25, 2005, that an
amended petition would be filed no later than March 4, 2005. Id. The case was finally
dismissed for inactivity on June 14, 2005. Id.
On August 9, 2005, Eby inquired of the clerk regarding the status of his case, and
began filing pro se motions, including a motion to appoint counsel. Id. The district court
ordered that a new attorney be appointed, and on March 7, 2006, the public defender filed
a notice designating Linda Payne as Eby's fourth post-conviction attorney. Id. As of May
24, 2006, Payne was apparently unaware that Eby' s case had already been dismissed, but
on August 22, 2006, she filed an amended petition, which prompted an objection from the
state because Eby's petition had already been dismissed. Id. at 733-34. On April 9, 2007,
Payne filed a motion to set aside the order of dismissal, which was heard April 17, 2007,
when Payne argued for the first time that relief should be available to Eby under I.R.C.P.
60(b). Id. The district court denied the motion. Id.
After concluding that relief from a dismissal for inactivity could be addressed in a
Rule 60(b) motion, id. at 734-36, this Court addressed the questions of whether "neglect
by post-conviction relief counsel [constitutes] grounds upon which relief under I.R.C.P.
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60(b)(6) may be granted" and whether the district court's denial of Eby' s motion
constituted an abuse of discretion, id. at 736. After noting the limited nature of its decision,
explaining that "individuals are generally bound by their attorney's actions," and
reaffirming there is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, this
Court concluded, "Given the unique status of a post-conviction proceeding, and given the
complete absence of meaningful representation in the only available proceeding for Eby

to advance constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence, we conclude that this
case may present the 'unique and compelling circumstances' in which I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)
relief may well be warranted." Id. at 736-37 (emphasis added).
Pizzuto does not even allege a "complete absence of meaningful representation,"
but merely contends his prior attorney was "negligent" and made "serious missteps," that
are based upon the argument that prior counsel's actions resulted in the district court
implicitly denying a motion for additional testing when the court dismissed Pizzuto' s
Atkins petition. (Brief, pp.16-19.) However, the district court's decision was not based
upon counsel's actions that allegedly resulted in the denial of her motion for additional
testing, but her filing the Motion for Summary Judgment asserting there were no genuine
issues of material fact and that no additional evidence was required.
After Pizzuto filed his Atkins petition, the state filed a Motion for Summary
Dismissal. (#32679, R., pp.114-15.) Joan Fisher, Pizzuto's Atkins attorney, filed a motion
to disqualify the district judge.

(#32679, R., pp.122-24.) Although her motion for

disqualification was still pending, Fisher also filed a motion to permit additional testing to
complete a neuropsychiatric evaluation.

(Id., pp.131-34.)

The district court denied

Fisher's motion to disqualify. (Id., pp.193-94.) Fisher filed a motion for an interlocutory
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appeal (id., pp.195-98), which the court also denied (id., pp.232-33). Continuing to pursue
the disqualification issue, Fisher filed motions for interlocutory appeal with this Court,
which were denied. (R., pp.37-45.) During oral argument on her motions before the district
court, Fisher conceded the district court could not rule on her motion for additional testing
as long as her motions to disqualify and for an interlocutory appeal were pending. (#32679,
Tr., pp.52, 60-61.) Fisher subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting
there were "no genuine issues of material fact in this case" (#32679, R., pp.280-81) with
a significant number of supporting affidavits (#32679, R., pp.248-76). At that time, the
district court had not ruled on Fisher's motion for additional testing, presumably because
she had not noticed it for hearing. During oral argument on the parties' dispositive motions,
Fisher vigorously argued in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment relying upon
the evidence submitted with the successive petition and the subsequent affidavits. (#32679,
Tr., pp.85-91.) Indeed, while Fisher asked the district court to rule on her motion for
additional testing if the court denied her Motion for Summary Judgment, she reiterated
that, based upon Hthe record of the prior proceedings and what we've submitted thus far,"
she could not "imagine" the district court would deny her Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Id., pp.105-06.) The district court never ruled on Fisher's motion for additional testing,
but denied her Motion for Summary Judgment, granted the state's Motion for Summary
Dismissal, and denied post-conviction relief. (#32679, R., pp.309-10.)
On appeal, Fisher continued to press the issue of disqualification, explaining why
I.R.C.P 40(d)(l )(I)(ii), which prevented the automatic disqualification of the judge that
entered the judgment of conviction being challenged in post-conviction, should not apply
under the facts of Pizzuto's case. Pizzuto V, 146 Idaho at 724-25. However, this Court
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rejected the arguments, as well as the arguments addressing why the district judge should
have been disqualified for cause. Id.
The Ninth Circuit noted Fisher's failure to seek a hearing on her motion for
additional testing, and speculated that Fisher "apparently concluded that, because the court
had erroneously denied the motion to disqualify, any order entered by the court on the
question of testing would be void." Pizzuto, 933 F.3d at 1173 n.2.
Based upon Fisher's failure to seek a hearing or get a ruling on her motion for
additional testing, Pizzuto contends, "By staking a key request for evidentiary development
entirely on the success of a far-fetched legal gambit, prior counsel did not discharge her
duties, and her performance does not survive the judicial scrutiny called for in a capital
case," which, according to Pizzuto, constitutes unique and compelling circumstances under
Eby. (Brief, p.21) Pizzuto' s argument fails on several fronts.
First, Pizzuto has failed to establish that Fisher's failure to notice her motion for
additional testing for hearing constitutes a "complete absence of meaningful
representation." Eby~ 148 Idaho at 737. As this Court explained, the facts in Eby involved
"years of shocking and disgraceful neglect of his case by a series of attorneys." Id. at 732.
Fisher's failure to notice the motion for additional testing for hearing was a single incident
that arguably was based upon strategic reasons, and became moot when she filed the
Motion for Summary Judgment. Indeed, Pizzuto does not even allege a "complete absence
of meaningful representation," presumably because he recognizes the record does not
support such an allegation. Irrespective of the validity of Fisher's motion to disqualify the
district judge or her failure to notice her motion for additional testing for hearing, she
vigorously represented Pizzuto by filing the initial Atkins petition with supporting
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documents, filing various motions, and then making a tactical decision based upon the
underlying record, the supporting documents, and the new affidavits that she should seek
summary judgment because there were no genuine issues of material fact. That cannot
constitute a complete absence of meaningful representation as required by Eby.
Rather, Pizzuto's case is akin to Devan v. State, 162 Idaho 520, 523-24 (Ct. App.
2017), where the Court of Appeals recognized that Eby should not be read "to open the
door to challenge the effectiveness of post-conviction counsel by virtue of a Rule 60(b)
motion." The court noted that, while post-conviction counsel failed to file a response to
the state's motion to dismiss, counsel met with the petitioner, reviewed the case to
determine whether to file an amended petition, and appeared at the summary dismissal
hearing. Id. at 823. In Dixon v. State, 157 Idaho 582, 587-88 (Ct. App. 2014), the court
distinguished Eby because counsel presented his claim and represented him at an
evidentiary hearing. "While there may have been a fatal evidentiary gap at the postconviction trial, Rule 60(b)(6) does not provide an avenue to retry the case or supplement
the evidence" "even if we consider that Dixon's post-conviction counsel failed to present
evidence at the post-conviction hearing as to one of the claims." Id. In Bias v. State, 159
Idaho 696, 706 (Ct. App. 2015), the court of appeals rejected the notion that ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel constitutes a complete absence of meaningful
representation, noting that post-conviction counsel filed a responsive brief and supporting
affidavits after the state filed its motion for summary dismissal. Id. at 707.
Pizzuto initially attempts to distinguish Devan, Dixon, and Bias by asserting the
obvious - this Court is not bound by decisions from the Idaho Court of Appeals. (Brief, _
p.19.)

Irrespective, the analysis from the Court of Appeals is exceptionally sound,
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following the dictates from this Court in Eby. and the law under Rule 60(b)( 6) that relief
be granted only upon a showing of unique and compelling circumstances, which has
resulted in the courts infrequently granting relief.
Pizzuto next raises the ever-present motto that "death is different." (Brief, pp.1920.) However, Pizzuto has failed to cite any case where the standards associated with Rule
60(b)(6) were jettisoned just because of the death penalty, particularly when the Rule
60(b)(6) motion has been filed in a fifth post-conviction petition, is clearly untimely, and
lacks so little merit as in this case.
Finally, Pizzuto attempts to distinguish the trio of Court of Appeals cases based
upon their respective facts. (Brief, pp.20-21.) However, because the Court of Appeals
properly applied the dictates of Eby. those factual distinctions are without a difference. See
State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642,651 (2017) (noting a distinction without a difference when the
underlying rationale of prior precedent is followed); State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 72223 (2011) (explaining that the distinction between having a judge impose a death sentence
and a jury impose a death sentence is a distinction without a difference when deciding
whether the utter disregard aggravator is constitutional).
Pizzuto's argument next fails because Eby involved counsel's performance in the
first post-conviction case, not a successive post-conviction case as in this case.

As

explained in Parvin v. State, 157 Idaho 518, 521 (Ct. App. 2014), "The rule 60(b) motion
that Parvin wishes to be considered must be filed in his first post-conviction case." See
also Lopez v. State, 157 Idaho 795, 798 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Eby. 148 Idaho at 736)

("The Court's decision in Eby was 'limited in scope' to requests for relief from final
judgments in an initial post-conviction proceeding under Rule 60(b)(6)."). In his Reply
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Brief before the district court, Pizzuto argued his Atkins petition was actually a "first postconviction proceeding" because it was not ripe until the issuance of Atkins. (R., pp.71516) (emphasis omitted).

This argument fails because it is based upon Panetti v.

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 942-47 (2007), which is premised on federal habeas law, not
the demands of LC. § 19-2719(3) that require the filing of all claims that are known or
reasonably should be known in the first petition. Admittedly, the claim in Pizzuto's Atkins
petition could not have been known when he filed his first post-conviction because at that
time ID murderers could be executed. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
That does not mean it was a "first post-conviction proceeding," only that he could pass the
mandate of having the merits of the claim addressed under LC.§ 19-2719(5).
Third, as demonstrated by her briefing before the post-conviction court and this
Court, Fisher's arguments regarding disqualification were hardly "far-fetched." Certainly,
this Court did not consider the arguments to be "far-fetched" or even without merit, either
with respect to the automatic or cause motions for disqualification. Pizzuto V, 146 Idaho
at 724-26. And merely because it was "foreseeable that the Idaho Supreme Court might
reject them in favor of the plain language of the rule" (Brief, p.18) (emphasis added), does
not equate into something that is "far-fetched." Capital attorneys are certainly known to
file motions that dig deep into the well of their imaginations, but this is hardly one of those
situations. Indeed, the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases mandate that post-conviction counsel "continue an
aggressive investigation of all aspects" of a death penalty case and seek to litigate "all
arguably meritorious" issues.

Guideline 10.15.l(C) (2003); Guideline 10.15.l(E)(4)

(2003).
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Pizzuto has failed to establish that Fisher's work prior to the post-conviction court
dismissing his case falls under the gambit of I. C.R.P. 60(b)(6) because her work was
extensive and hardly constituted a complete absence of meaningful representation.
G.

Pizzuto Is Not Entitled To Another Evidentiary Hearing
Pizzuto contends he is "entitled" to an evidentiary hearing, and that he has a right

to such a hearing under the federal Constitution. (Brief, pp.21-30.) Because Pizzuto has
failed to demonstrate his Motion is timely and that unique and compelling circumstances
exist as required by Rule 60(b)(6), he is not entitled to any relief, let alone "restarting" his
post-conviction case. Irrespective, he is neither entitled to an evidentiary hearing nor is
one mandated by the Constitution.
Initially, Pizzuto's only justification for an evidentiary hearing is the evidence he
presented in his prior pleadings during the initial litigation of his Atkins post-conviction
case. However, other than merely "refer[ing] the Court" to that evidence, Pizzuto does not
discuss the content of that evidence or otherwise explain why it justifies an evidentiary
hearing.

This Court has stated that arguments cannot be merely incorporated from

pleadings in the underlying post-conviction case, but must be directly raised on appeal.
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386,414 n.12 (2015). The same should be true for evidence
referenced in those underlying pleadings to support a claim on appeal. Incorporation of
evidence is not sufficient, it should be expressly identified, addressed, and there should be
explanation regarding how it supports a specific argument.
Irrespective, Pizzuto' s argument for another evidentiary hearing fails because all of
the evidence that he desires to present at the evidentiary hearing was presented at the
federal evidentiary hearing. (R., pp.944-1368.) Consequently, it is barred by the doctrine
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of res judicata. In Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123 (2007), this Court
discussed the purposes behind res judicata:
(1) [I]t preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the
corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice
litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in protecting
the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances
the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims.

While "[t]he doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res

judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel)," "[s]eparate tests are used to determine
whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies." Id. Five factors are required for
issue preclusion, which include:
(1) [T]he party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the
issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in
the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided
in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the
prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a
party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation.

Id. at 124.
There are three requirements for claim preclusion, "(1) same parties; (2) same
claim; and (3) final judgment." Id. "[T]he 'sameness' of a claim for res judicata purposes
is determined by examining the operative facts underlying the two causes of action." State
v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 63 (2015). "Claim preclusion bars adjudication not only on the
matters offered and received to defeat the claim, but also as to 'every matter which might
and should have been litigated in the first suit.'" Ticor, 144 Idaho at 126 (quoting Magic
Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434,437 (1993)).
In State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 482 (2000), this Court applied res judicata to
a Rule 35 motion that was raised before the district court, but never appealed, and then
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raised in a second Rule 3 5 motion that was appealed. This Court reasoned, "the doctrine
of res judicata can be applied to bar consideration of subsequent Rule 35 motions to the
extent those motions attempt to relitigate issues already finally decided in earlier Rule 35
motions." Id. The Court also rejected Rhoades' contention that the second Rule 35 motion
"is not the same issue litigated earlier," concluding, "[w]hile the two motions may be
worded somewhat differently, they nevertheless encompass the same issue: namely,
whether the district judge erred in giving Rhoades a separate sentence enhancement for
each crime for which he was convicted, rather than a single sentence enhancement for his
entire course of conduct." Id. at 864.
The doctrine of resjudicata has been applied in both criminal, State v. Creech, 132
Idaho 1, 9 n.1 (1998), and post-conviction cases, Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 797 (Ct.
App. 2012) (citing cases). In Creech, 132 Idaho at 9 n.l (citations omitted), this Court
applied the doctrine of res judicata in a capital case, and concluded it also applies to any
issues adjudicated in federal court even if the case is remanded to state court, explaining:
This doctrine applies to any issues raised by Creech and adjudicated in his
habeas corpus proceeding in the federal courts. Habeas corpus proceedings,
like state post-conviction relief proceedings, are separate and distinct
proceedings, separate from criminal proceedings, and are civil in nature.
Thus, when legal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal,
the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising them
again in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Similarly, when an issue is
decided in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the doctrine of res judicata
applies to prevent the issue from being addressed again by this Court on
remand.
Whether viewed under issue or claim preclusion, because of the litigation in federal
court regarding the same ID claim, Pizzuto is barred from having his current case reopened
under the doctrine of res judicata. As to issue preclusion, (1) the parties had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the ID claim, including the issues associated with Hall; (2) the issue
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- whether Pizzuto is ID - is identical to what was litigated in federal court; (3) whether
Pizzuto is ID was decided by the federal district court under de novo review based upon
the evidence from the evidentiary hearing; (4) there was a final judgment; and (5) Pizzuto
was clearly a party. As to claim preclusion, (1) the parties were the same; (2) it is the same
claim-whether Pizzuto is ID; and (3) there was a final judgment.
Admittedly, on remand Pizzuto sought to reopen the federal evidentiary hearing to
present further evidence ofID. Pizzuto, 2016 WL 6963030 at *11. However, the federal
court rejected Pizzuto's request, explaining:
Pizzuto has not convinced the Court that the previous evidentiary hearing
was insufficient in any way. [Pizzuto] had an adequate opportunity and a
strong incentive to bring forward all his evidence at the evidentiary hearing.
Not only has Pizzuto failed to prove that his IQ was 70 or below, but having
reviewed all the evidence once again on remand, the Court finds that Pizzuto
has also failed to prove that his IQ was 75 or below before he turned
eighteen. Thus, nothing in Hall renders suspect any of the Court's previous
findings and conclusions on de novo review.

Pizzuto has also failed to establish any basis for presenting the same evidence to
the state district court when he had every opportunity to present all his evidence at the
evidentiary hearing in federal court. Pizzuto's attempt to have a "redo" in state court when
he failed to meet his burden in federal court is the very reason the doctrine of res judicata
was adopted. See Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 123 (discussing the policies regarding the
res judicata doctrine). The district court should not be burdened with litigating a claim

that was rejected in federal court. Neither should the state, particularly Idaho County, be
harassed and required to litigate a claim already rejected in the federal court after a full
evidentiary hearing. Neither should the judicial system be saddled with the potential for
inconsistent results when the matter was fully litigated in federal court.
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In his Reply Brief before the district court, Pizzuto relied upon a single non-binding
case from Hawaii to contend res judicata does not apply because he was seeking en bane
review from the Ninth Circuit and review from the Supreme Court. (R., p.721.) No Idaho
court has ever followed this ill-placed argument. Moreover, Pizzuto sought en bane review
and did not prevail. While he has a petition for certiorari pending before the Supreme
Court, that will be resolved on the first Monday in October. Consequently, even if this
Court concludes the district court abused its discretion by finding Pizzuto' s Rule 60(b)(6)
motion was untimely and without merit, by the time it returns to the district court Pizzuto's
federal challenges will be completed. Consequently, this Court's decision in Creech, 132
Idaho at 9 n.1, is controlling irrespective of the Ninth Circuit's dicta regarding whether
Idaho's courts should readdress the issue, which, as explained above, is hardly controlling.
Next, Pizzuto's reliance upon Brumfield supra, is misplaced. (Brief, pp.29-30.) In
Brumfield, the issue before the Court was AEDPA under 28 U.S.C. § 2254( d)(2). The
federal district found Brumfield met his burden under§ 2254(d)(2), conducted a federal
evidentiary hearing, and, based upon that evidence, concluded Brumfield met his burden
of establishing ID. Brumfield v. Cain, 744 F.3d 918, 922 (5 th Cir. 2014). On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit concluded the district court did not give proper AEDPA deference and,
therefore, should not have conducted the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 926. Consequently,
the Fifth Circuit disregarded the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed, but based only upon the Fifth Circuit's conclusion regarding
AEDPA deference. Brumfield, 135 S.Ct. at 2276-82. While the Fifth Circuit's judgment
was vacated, the case was "remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion,"
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presumably to allow the Fifth Circuit to consider de novo the evidence that was presented
to the federal district judge at the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 2283.
This does not support Pizzuto' s contention that he is constitutionally mandated to
an evidentiary hearing in state court when he previously had one in federal court that
resulted in an adverse decision because he did not meet his burden of establishing ID. The
Supreme Court's entire analysis in Brumfield was based upon AEDP A, and did not
mandate that state courts are constitutionally required to provide every murderer sentenced
to death an evidentiary hearing just because of an ID claim. Even Atkins recognized, "Not
all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range
of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus." 536 U.S. at 317.
Pizzuto anticipated the decision in Hall when he presented his evidence at the
federal evidentiary hearing.

He repeatedly argued that Atkins required the legal

determination of ID be informed by the medical community's diagnostic framework. In
short, Pizzuto has now had three bites at the apple: one in state court, one in federal court
prior to Hall being issued, and the second on remand after Hall was issued; he should not
receive a fourth bite before the state district court.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that Hairston's appeal be dismissed or, alternatively,
that the decision of the trial court be affirmed on appeal.
DATED this 26 th day of June, 2020.

IslL. LaMont Anderson
L.LaMONT ANDERSON
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
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